As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Corbin Carroll and Evan Carter were important, too. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Corey Seager is valuable because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process.

One note: In the pitching section, I took a more specific look at reliever matchups. This 2022 Cameron Grove study measures a repeat-matchup reliever penalty. A recent article examines the issue without focusing on specific matchups, but rather looking at relievers pitching on back-to-back days or on short rest after heavy workloads. Both of these things are, unsurprisingly, bad for reliever performance. Managing the balance between starter and reliever over-work is really hard. I probably haven’t given enough credit to the necessity of balancing bullpen workloads against particular opposing batters in the past, but I’ll make a note of it going forward.

I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round, the various Division Series eliminations, the ALCS, and the NLCS. Today, it’s Torey Lovullo’s turn.

Torey Lovullo, Arizona Diamondbacks
Batting: D+
So many bunts. So many bunts. That’s largely what I’ll remember about Lovullo’s offensive choices this postseason.

It didn’t get started right away. In their first series, Arizona hitters swung away normally and beat up an excellent Milwaukee pitching staff. They followed that up by putting 11 on the Dodgers to open the NLDS, no bunts needed. But maybe it was more that the situation to bunt never appeared, because in Game 2, Geraldo Perdomo got the train rolling with what I’d consider an ill-advised sacrifice. Up 3–0 and with Evan Longoria on first, he sacrificed himself for the first out of the second inning. With all of the team’s power coming up and with a slow runner on base, this just doesn’t add up. Longoria won’t always score on a single, and Perdomo is a decent hitter. It’s too early to be playing for one run, though I’ll admit the score makes that at least slightly more palatable.

But we can’t linger on this one, because there are more to get to. Perdomo bunted again in the ninth, with a 4–2 lead and pinch-runner Jordan Lawlar on first. This one led the Dodgers to walk Corbin Carroll, and no run scored. Perdomo gave up on his bunts for Game 3 and hit a homer to open the scoring as the Diamondbacks swept.

It might seem like I’m not focusing on any non-bunt decisions Lovullo made. That’s because he simply didn’t make any, running out the same nine starters in each game of both series. The first pinch-hitter he called for was in the bottom of the fifth of Game 3, and I think he maybe shouldn’t have; he replaced Gabriel Moreno with Pavin Smith in an attempt to tack on extra runs, with two outs, two on, and a righty pitching. I think I’d rather have Moreno, particularly considering that backup catcher Jose Herrera was definitely going to get another turn at bat.

Still, those series were relatively straightforward. Against the Phillies, Lovullo had to go to his bench more and made a pinch-hitting blunder right away. With one on and two out, Arizona trailed by two in the bottom of the seventh. Seranthony Domínguez was on the mound. Lovullo brought in Smith in place of Longoria, but it made Rob Thomson’s counter-decision a snap: bring in José Alvarado. The switch- and lefty-heavy chunk of Arizona’s lineup follows Longoria, so Alvarado was ready to come into the game anyway. That forced Lovullo to pull Smith for a rusty Emmanuel Rivera. Just leave Longoria in!

By Game 3, Lovullo changed his lineup against a lefty for the first time in the postseason, bringing in Rivera for Thomas. He also flipped Ketel Marte and Carroll atop the lineup, a change I really like, since a lefty starter who wanted to get a third bite at Carroll before departing now had to face Marte first. That’s a clever little move. As an added wrinkle, Lovullo went to a lefty-heavy lineup after Ranger Suárez departed; Thomas came in for Tommy Pham, and Smith took over DH duties from Longoria. I could go either way on the DH decision, but getting Thomas into the game for his handedness and defense is a great move in my book.

In a rousing Game 4 comeback, Lovullo used a variation on that script. He brought in his lefties for Pham and Rivera this time, and Thomas rewarded him with a pinch-hit game-tying homer off of Craig Kimbrel. The Diamondbacks were playing close games and getting every last bit out of their roster, which is really all you can ask for when it comes to managing batting orders in the playoffs.

The last three games featured two blowouts and a close one, but a few interesting managerial wrinkles. Lovullo sat Pham in a tough matchup with Zack Wheeler, a move I agreed with even though it differed from his lineup construction earlier in the series. Carroll also dropped down a sacrifice bunt in an uncompetitive Game 6, though I don’t think Lovullo called for it; it was one of those go-for-a-single bunts, the kind fast players often ad-lib.

In the deciding Game 7, Perdomo sacrificed with Rivera on first and no one out with a one-run deficit. Really, really don’t do that. Two of the next three Diamondbacks hitters singled, so the run was scoring anyway, and you shouldn’t play for a tying run basically ever, let alone so early in the game. This is how you turn crooked innings less crooked or scoring chances into “can you believe our two good hitters made outs?” It worked out, but not because it was a percentage play; per our game log, it cost the Diamondbacks nearly 3% of a win, a staggering number for a bunt.

Regardless of my disdain for that bunt, Arizona advanced, generating far more offense than the opposition even if Lovullo was a bit profligate with his outs. That led the Diamondbacks to the World Series and a buzzsaw of a Rangers team. And wouldn’t you know it, Arizona started it off by bunting. With runners on first and second and no one out, Perdomo sacrificed facing a two-run deficit. Carroll cleared the bases with a triple — extra-base hits make sacrifices look silly — but the Diamondbacks would have killed for another out that inning, which ended with Marte in scoring position. Am I being results-oriented there? Sure, but my point is that bunts generally decrease traffic on the bases, which Arizona needed badly this game, and really in the series.

I’m skipping over Longoria’s Game 2 bunt, which he reportedly did on his own. Perdomo followed up with another — up two, runner on first, no one out, top seven — that I hated less than most of his bunts in the playoffs. Lourdes Gurriel Jr. got in on the act next inning with a runner on first, no one out, and a three-run lead. That one didn’t matter much, because Arizona was in such a good position anyway, but just for the record, four of the next five batters reached. The Diamondbacks were shockingly good at giving away outs in innings and games where they were rolling. This Game 2 was a great example: plenty of bad bunts and nine runs anyway thanks to 16 hits and only two strikeouts.

After two routine losses — hey, the Rangers are good! — the Diamondbacks had one last preposterous bunt in store. Moreno stepped to the plate with two on and no one out in a must-win Game 5. The score was tied in the bottom of the third, and five of the 11 Arizona hitters who had batted had reached base. You need runs to beat the Rangers — but Moreno bunted, a pure sacrifice. He’d never recorded one before in his career. Why would he? He’s a good hitter! He apparently made that decision on his own, but c’mon: What are we doing here? He’s one of the best hitters on the team. By the numbers, this is one of the least detrimental sacrifice bunts the Diamondbacks laid down all postseason, but I still hate it.

In the end, the bunts didn’t doom Arizona’s chances. The ones I counted as clear sacrifice attempts cost them an aggregate 6.6% of a win, according to our numbers. But why in the world would you cost yourself so much in the playoffs? I won’t even let Lovullo off the hook for the ones he didn’t specifically call for. Good managers don’t just push a few buttons during the game; they cultivate a winning clubhouse and get their team to make good decisions. Lovullo didn’t seem to be able to get his team out of its own way when it came to giving up outs.

I love this Prince Fielder anecdote about Craig Counsell; he knew, even as a player, that the good hitters shouldn’t be bunting. That’s not a controversial statement, but it seemed to slip away from the Diamondbacks as the postseason wore on, and their offense suffered for it. I think Lovullo mostly made good decisions about who to play. He just kept making or letting them bunt.

Pitching: C-
Arizona came out swinging with a bullpen plan against the Brewers. Seven pitchers appeared in Game 1, with Brandon Pfaadt drawing the start after the team’s top two starters had pitched to close out the regular season. He gave up a shocking amount of traffic — eight baserunners against eight outs, with one out a sacrifice bunt — and Lovullo pulled the plug quickly. He didn’t mess around, which is the right call in a short series like this one; he played every matchup, used Kevin Ginkel for two innings, and generally behaved like this game was must-win. In a three-game series, it basically is. Top marks here, and ditto for Game 2. When Ginkel stumbled in that one, Lovullo went to lefty Andrew Saalfrank against a lefty-heavy pocket of the Milwaukee lineup, then had Paul Sewald close it out.

Against the Dodgers, Lovullo mostly had it easy. Merrill Kelly got staked to a 9–0 lead early, which let the low-leverage relievers handle the balance of the game. I didn’t like using Joe Mantiply here, though, and as we’ll see, Lovullo had a bad habit of using relievers he trusts in uncompetitive games. In Game 2, he pulled Zac Gallen in a tough spot: two on and one out with a three-run lead in the sixth. He went to Saalfrank, and the Dodgers countered with two righties who each reached base. Saalfrank got the last lefty in the three-batter group he was in for, and then Ryan Thompson, Ginkel, and Sewald closed things out.

In Game 3, Pfaadt again put up a short-ish start, though this time he was more effective. Lovullo pulled him to put the hammer down, bringing in Mantiply the first time Los Angeles put a runner in scoring position. That could have backfired, because Arizona’s bullpen was shaky; Mantiply got four uneventful outs, but Thompson gave up four consecutive singles to score two runs. Luckily for the Diamondbacks, the Dodgers’ bench was abysmal this postseason. Lovullo brought in Saalfrank against a lefty (David Peralta), and Dave Roberts countered by pinch-hitting with Austin Barnes (!), one of the worst hitters in baseball this year. I would’ve preferred a real hitter, even with a platoon disadvantage, but I credit Lovullo for forcing Roberts’ hand. The rest of the game was all Ginkel and Sewald, easy peasy.

Game 1 of the NLCS was a blowout — Gallen got tagged for four early runs, and Arizona couldn’t quite climb back into it — so Lovullo wisely used some low-leverage arms. But Game 2 featured what I consider one of his worst decisions. The Diamondbacks got absolutely shelled that night. Mantiply came in in relief of Kelly and got torched, which put the game out of hand; Ryne Nelson got even more torched, and it was 10–0. Both teams started putting backups in to save on wear and tear. But there was Saalfrank, a reliever the Diamondbacks planned to use extensively, in the ninth inning of a 10–0 game, and he was pitching against Bryce Harper, who he faced in each of the next two games. Slade Cecconi was on the roster specifically to mop up, and he had done just that. He’d only thrown 14 pitches. You can’t let him face Harper and rest your preferred lefty reliever? What was the point of getting Saalfrank into the game there? It boggles my mind.

I have a secondary gripe about this game, but I just wanted to highlight that one first as beyond the pale. I mentioned that Mantiply had a rough outing, but I think that he was set up to fail. The Phillies have five lefties in their top five hitters, including some dangerous ones. A trio of Harper/Alec Bohm/Bryson Stott seems like a great place for a lefty reliever. A trio of Stott/J.T. Realmuto/Nick Castellanos seems much worse — and it made Kelly face Harper instead. Mantiply came in, and when he didn’t get Stott out (hey, it happens), the righties ate him up. With a three-batter minimum, it pays to think a move or two ahead, and I felt that Lovullo got this one wrong. I’d probably take Kelly over Mantiply for that three-batter grouping; it didn’t matter much, because Brandon Marsh doubled anyway, but it felt weird to bring in a lefty and have him end up in a spot where he had bad matchups for most of the batters he faced.

In Game 3, Pfaadt turned in a nine-strikeout, two-hit gem. Lovullo pulled him after 18 batters, and as much as I didn’t like it when I was watching, I think it was a good decision. The top of the Philly lineup is stacked with lefties, like we talked about; here are those great lefty pockets to use your two impact specialists. Saalfrank promptly walked two of the three batters he faced, though; he was tremendously wild all series. After that, Lovullo didn’t mess around, using his top three arms to close things out.

Game 4, the Thomas/Kimbrel game, was a planned bullpen game. The Diamondbacks stuck to a script: one-inning bursts for the middle of the bullpen, then four innings from the top three guys to close things out. The plan was flexible enough to use lefties when appropriate, but again, Saalfrank didn’t have it, walking three straight batters to start the sixth inning. Sprinkle in a little bad defense, a little bit of Thompson getting hit, and Philly took a 5–2 lead, setting up Thomas’s heroics. To Lovullo’s credit, he persisted in using his best arms even down late; when you’re down 2–1 in the series, I don’t think there’s any question of playing for tomorrow.

Game 5 provided a decision-making breather; Gallen got shelled, and the offense only scored a single run, so Cecconi and company got in on the action. That set up two straight win-or-go-home games, but Arizona made things easy by racing to a 4–1 lead in Game 6. Given that, I thought Lovullo pulled Kelly too quickly, after five innings, 90 pitches, and 21 batters faced. Instead, he ran Thompson out to start the sixth, sprinkled in Saalfrank for some lefties, and went back to the high octane bullpen arms with the game well in hand. A little more out of Kelly, who was pitching quite well and facing the bottom of the Philly lineup, would have given Diamondbacks relievers some much-needed rest.

In Game 7, Pfaadt scuffled through four innings, with strikeout stuff but also plenty of loud contact. The Diamondbacks’ bullpen wasn’t remotely rested — Lovullo had been running out his key guys at every opportunity — but would have to cover the last five innings. Mantiply narrowly survived a Harper at-bat. Thompson retired Bohm to escape the fifth, then got the Stott/Realmuto/Castellanos group that had been a lefty’s job earlier in the series. Saalfrank? He walked the world again. But luckily, Ginkel covered 1.2 innings and Sewald closed things out for a narrow series win.

I really didn’t like Lovullo’s pitcher usage this series. He leaned heavily on Saalfrank, not always in easy situations, and Saalfrank looked like he had no idea where the plate was, facing 13 batters in the series and walking seven. Meanwhile, Thompson was out there against the same guys over and over and over and over; he faced Bohm, Castellanos, and Stott four times each. If you know that the same three relievers are going to cover all the high-leverage innings, it would behoove you to mix up the matchups somewhat. I get that the Diamondbacks had no choice but to rely on their bullpen in some games, but short hooks and overuse made things tougher for their relievers than it had to be.

In the World Series, Lovullo stuck with what brought him there: the triple barrels of Thompson, Ginkel, and Sewald whenever possible. Sewald gave up a ninth-inning homer to Corey Seager that tied the game, but I don’t think it was because of poor managing; sometimes their best beat your best, and Seager is great. Lovullo also lengthened out his hooks on starters slightly. Kelly went seven strong innings in Game 2, and Saalfrank (demoted to low-leverage duty) and Luis Frías handled the rest.

I liked Lovullo’s Game 3 decision to pack it in somewhat early, though I didn’t like the execution. Down 3–0, he didn’t go to his standard late-game monsters, instead using Miguel Castro, Kyle Nelson, Frías, and Saalfrank. You can’t use your best relievers every single time, and the next day was a bullpen game. It’s a great time to sacrifice a tiny bit of run prevention, particularly since you can always reverse course if your team starts scoring. The Diamondbacks didn’t, but hey, that’s life. Great decision — but all three of those guys were part of the plan for the next day, whereas Cecconi and Ryne Nelson weren’t. If you’re committing to a bullpen game in the middle game of a three-game stretch, I think you have to try a little harder to stay off your relievers in the first game of that stretch.

That bullpen game in Game 4 was a disaster. I don’t think it made sense to start Mantiply given that the top of the Rangers’ lineup alternates righty/lefty; I would have saved him for the bottom. But it’s not like the righties did well; Castro gave up a raftload of hard contact, Frías got tagged for a homer and a double, and the game was basically over in three innings. Here’s one issue with the bullpen game plan: those two relievers had pitched the previous day! They were key parts of the early-inning plan against Texas. Kyle Nelson and Saalfrank both pitched, too, and the latter gave up a gargantuan homer to Seager. That means Lovullo accomplished the strange feat of punting Game 3 by tiring out three arms he already knew would be a key part of Game 4.

Gane 5 was just a hard-luck loss. Gallen was brilliant, giving up only a single run over 6.1 strong innings. Ginkel bridged them to the ninth. Sewald finally ran out of gas, surrendering a four-spot, but it didn’t matter because the Diamondbacks never scored. It was an anticlimactic ending to an overall anticlimactic World Series; the most exciting game was the first one by a fair margin.

Lovullo had his moments managing his bullpen this postseason, but I think he missed the mark badly in the Philadelphia series. His hooks were too quick given the work he knew he’d be putting his bullpen through. He leaned on his best guys, but not in a way that kept them fresh or avoided repeat matchups. And he didn’t seem to know what to do with Saalfrank; that appearance against Harper as the last out of a 10-run game still boggles my mind. In the World Series, he had some great moments — and then he burned out the next day’s bullpen game staff in a low-leverage spot for minimal gain. I don’t think this was a complete debacle, particularly when taken in aggregate, but better decisions have been made.

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